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Abstract
In this article, we develop a republican framework for relational animal eth-
ics, recently popularized in Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis. This republi-
can framework departs from the focus on negative rights that dominate liberal 
animal rights theories, especially as concerns our relations to wild animals. Our 
proposed framework appeals to a republican standard of non-arbitrariness, or 
non-domination, for human interferences with such animals. This legitimation 
framework is more attentive to relations of care and of dependency between 
the species, which we contend fi ts the growing fi eld of relational animal ethics. 
At the same time, it requires rigorous criteria be met to legitimate relations as 
non-dominating. We apply this framework to the morality of the supplementary 
feeding of wildlife, using a case study of wild boars as fed by hunters. Weakening 
of the concept of domination to fi t the predicament of boars, we show how the 
republican framework can provide a principled justifi cation for legitimate interfer-
ence with a wild animal population.
1. INTRODUCTION 
An alternative to the negative rights slant in animal rights, focusing 
on abolition and hands-off approaches, has now surfaced within critical 
animal studies (Mackenzie and Natalie 2000; Friedman 2008). Indeed, 
Relational Animal Rights Theory (henceforth RART) lays a founda-
tion for positive relations of care, mutuality and dependence between 
species. In so doing, the theory is sensitive to the multitude of ways in 
03_v21_n1_von Essen.indd   61 3/15/2016   4:17:20 PM
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 21(1) 201662
which human and non-human animals interact across shared territo-
ries. Perhaps the most fruitful development with RART is offered by 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), insofar as it extends a positive rela-
tion also to wild animals. They present a tripartite framework for moral 
obligations toward non-human animals based on our relation to them 
in the political community. Here domestic, liminal and wild animals are 
co-citizens, denizens and sovereigns respectively. This tripartite frame-
work defi nes our moral obligations towards non-humans and their cor-
responding political rights. 
In this article, we argue Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework is com-
pelling insofar as it stipulates positive duties in a fi eld that has been dom-
inated by negative rights (Rogers and Kaplan 2004). But we also believe 
that their proposed integration of negative rights and positive duties intu-
itively points in the direction of republican political theory rather than 
the liberal vein in which they write. Indeed, republicanism proposes this 
same integration of negative rights and positive duties, while arguing for 
a relational conception of justice as freedom from domination by others 
(Pettit 1996). We aim to develop an animal rights connection to republi-
canism and non-domination within the context of the RART envisioned 
by Donaldson and Kymlicka. But we also believe, in accordance with sev-
eral other critics (Cochrane 2013; Horta 2013; Hinchcliffe 2015; Ladwig 
2015), that Donaldson and Kymlicka have been insuffi ciently attentive to 
problems of applying key political concepts in this context of human and 
non-human relations, such as sovereignty and representation. 
Indeed, the problems here are closely interrelated: sovereigns can be rep-
resented to the extent that they can accept or reject others as their represen-
tatives. In republican language, representations of sovereigns are legitimate 
only to the extent they can be effectively contested by those represented. 
Needless to say, effective contestation is out of bounds for wild animals, 
who lack the cognitive and communicative capacities requisite for legitimate 
relations of contestable representation between humans and non-humans 
(Eckersley 1999; Smith 2012). Contesting on behalf of non-communicative 
others to secure their freedom from domination does, however, currently 
takes place for the marginal cases of humans such as the cognitively dis-
abled and some elders (Silvers and Francis 2005). This is provided those 
claims made resonate with others (i.e. they are not conjured out of the air) 
and are contestable by communicatively competent agents (Saward 2006). 
We believe, then, that there are contestable and therefore legitimate ways in 
which humans may represent non-humans, including wild animals.
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The feeding of wild animals provides a case study of human interfer-
ence for our philosophical argument. We analyze the sustained supplemen-
tary feeding of wild boars (Sus scrofa) by hunters in light of a republican 
standard of justifi cation as non-dominating interference (Pettit 1997). 
Does feeding practice satisfy the standard for interference in a wild animal 
community with which humans are interrelated? In the case of supplemen-
tary feeding that we focus on, the practice is typically done to facilitate 
the hunting and killing of boars for sport and culling their high numbers 
(Geisser and Reyer 2004). This lack of a benign intent behind the inter-
ference, indeed a kind of deception and a violation of the duty of fi delity 
in the language of Taylor (1992), suggests a prima facie case for saying 
supplemental feeding of wild boars constitutes a relation of domination. 
Nonetheless, we ask in accordance with republican criteria: (1) whether or 
to what extent it might satisfy the republican standard of non-dominating 
interference by respecting the good of the wild boar community; and (2) 
whether the practice of feeding is checked by appropriate accountability 
mechanisms preventing it from lapsing into unjustifi able, dominating inter-
ference in this wild animal community. 
Our line of argumentation requires us to reinterpret the con-
cept of domination in order to take into account that boars do not, as 
Donaldson and Kynlicka would argue, constitute a sovereign commu-
nity as characterized by moral powers of self-determination (Cochrane 
2013). This leads us to develop an idea of agentless domination (Lovett 
2010): the domination of those who cannot conceptualize or communi-
cate their good or contest different and opposing judgments as to how 
it is best understood in a given context of dispute. With respect to the 
contestability of the human/non-human relation, we develop the idea of 
proxy or dependent representative claim-making on behalf of wild ani-
mals. Donaldson and Kymlicka endorse this model for co-citizens, but 
fail to extend it to wild animals (Cochrane 2013). Proxy representation 
is a political process in which human disputants discursively construct 
the good of the wild boars in different contestable ways (Saward 2006). 
Here, we argue that determining whether public decisions regarding the 
continuation, stopping, or regulation of feeding for the boars satisfy the 
standard of non-arbitrary interference will be a function of robust critical 
deliberative processes of claim-making. 
Determining the moral status of supplementary feeding of wild game 
is urgent not least from a republican-based RART perspective. But its legit-
imacy is also inseparable from the legitimacy of hunting in contemporary 
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society. While public acceptance of hunting is very high at 86 percent in 
Sweden (Gadolin 2014) when compared to continental European states 
and North America (Peterson 2004), the supplementary feeding of wild 
boars raises ethical concerns over the extent of our stewardship. Practices 
that confuse political relations in the shared interspecies community, or 
Zoopolis, may risk eroding the public perception of both hunters and wild 
boars. 
This paper is divided into four sections. First, we describe the feed-
ing issue in Sweden. Second, we determine the political status of wild 
boars and engage with hunters’ defences of feeding as affi rming natural 
relations between the species. Third, we frame the feeding issue within 
the republican framework to determine its legitimacy. Fourth and fi nally, 
we tackle some key objections to framing the issue in republican terms. 
We situate our discussion within emerging scholarship within Relational 
Animal Rights Theory (RART), pioneered by Midgley (1983) and taken 
further by Burgess-Jackson (1998), Scruton (2000), Palmer (2012) and not 
least Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), whom we credit for providing our 
point of departure. Our republican slant to animal rights provides a for-
ward-looking framework that might challenge the liberal preoccupation 
with negative duties currently stifl ing the fi eld (Clement 2003; Horta 2013). 
Our discussion is intended not just as a contribution to RART and to the 
‘political turn’ in animal rights, but also as a call to wildlife managers and 
hunters to reassess the legitimacy of supplemental feeding practices.
2. THE FEEDING ISSUE
Supplementary feeding refers to the provision of natural or artifi -
cial feed, commonly grain, fruit or vegetables but in some cases animal-
ist by-products or processed foods to wild animals (Dunkley and Cattet 
2003). Feeding can be on a supplementary, emergency, winter or intercept 
nature, where the latter refers to feeding as a diversionary tactic that leads 
wildlife away from crops or human settlements (Dunkley and Cattet, 
2003; Geisser and Reyer 2004). The most valued and common form of 
supplementary feeding among Swedish hunters is that of roe deer in the 
winter months. Among members of the public, by contrast, bird-feeding 
is extensive and not generally regarded as an interference in the wild, 
refl ected in its scale and ubiquity across the western world (Jones and 
Reynolds 2008).
Supplementary feeding is substantially less regulated in Sweden than in 
other parts of Europe where more detailed restrictions apply. This paucity 
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of regulation can be attributed to the proviso ‘freedom with responsibil-
ity’ that characterises Swedish hunting. As part of the 2014 review of the 
hunting law, which comprises feeding regulation, a prohibition of supple-
mentary feeding of wildlife is proposed during non-winter months. Even 
during other seasons, the new legislation seems to indicate it will be easier 
to impose local prohibitions on feeding from the County Administrative 
Board, unless satisfactory agreements can be reached between landowners 
and hunters. 
Of all the fed wild species, wild boars are rapidly proliferating in 
Southern and Middle Sweden (Lemel and Truve 1999). This is attributed 
to a combination of boars having only humans as predators, being notori-
ously diffi cult to shoot, rejuvenating multiple times per year, and suffering 
no negative consequences of density dependency, while enjoying extensive 
supplementary feeding of all sorts of foods (Leaper, Massei, Gorman and 
Aspinall 1999; Bieber and Ruf 2005; Borowik, Curnlier and Jędrzejewska 
2013). The population explosion of boars is refl ected across the European 
continent where they are now the second most abundant ungulate and 
the most rapidly multiplying species (Keuling, Stier, and Mechtild 2009; 
Apollonio, Andersen, Reidar, and Putman 2010; Ucarli 20111). This is 
globally paralleled by feral pigs in Australia, invasive swine in the US, 
and crop-raiding warthogs in parts of Africa (Hampton, Spencer, Alpers, 
Twigg, Woolnough, Doust, Higgs, and Pluske 2014; Littin and Mellor 
2005; Massei, Coats, Quy, Storer, and Cowan 2010; Parkes, Ramsey, 
Macdonald, Walker, McKnight, Cohen, and Morrison 2010).
The damage done to agricultural crops by boar tusks when feed-
ing, raising piglets or using cropland as shelter, is reportedly extensively 
(Geisser and Reyer 2004; Herrero, García-Serrano, Couto, Ortuño, and 
García-González 2006; Ucarli 2011).  Farmers object to feeding as boars 
overpopulate rural areas and destroy crops. Ecologists by and large cau-
tion against such a degree of human interference with feeding patterns of 
wildlife. Indeed, the cascade effects of their proliferation and simultane-
ous dependency on human intervention are either uncertain or may wreak 
ecological havoc (Brittingham and Temple 1992; Fischer; Stallknecht, 
Luttrell, Page, Dhondt, and Converse 1997; Dunkley and Cattet 2003; 
Jones 2011) 
Hunters, on the other hand, are generally pro supplementary feed-
ing and go to great lengths to provide for their game. Their rationale is 
that it facilitates hunting the boars by concentrating the distribution of 
game to feeding stations (Geisser and Reyer 2004). Hunters also claim 
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supplementary feeding minimizes the suffering that would face many 
starving boars in the winter. This satisfi es their conscience, knowing 
that wild animals survive the winter months. All in all, the arguments of 
hunters have engendered a vexed socio-political situation wherein sup-
plementary feeding of a thriving, partly invasive population has become 
a frequent source of confl ict between hunters and farmers sharing the 
countryside.
2.1. The Political Status of Wild Boars
Donaldson AND Kymlicka’s (2011) argument is that the duties owed 
to wild boars are a function of our position in relation to them in the 
political community. Animals are ‘domestic,’ ‘liminal,’ or ‘wild’ which are 
tantamount to ‘citizen,’ ‘denizen,’ and ‘sovereign’ respectively. Our duties 
toward sovereigns involve protecting their autonomy without exploitative 
or paternalistic outside interference. It requires that we recognize that 
wild animals have the inclination, the capacity and, above all, the right to 
form autonomous sustaining communities. That is not to say we cannot 
or should not offer aid and assistance or, in extreme cases, intervention—
especially if we are somehow causally responsible for their predicament. 
To clarify this, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) distinguish between legit-
imate and illegitimate intervention, where the former restores the realiza-
tion of the species’ sovereignty, while the latter creates dependency. In their 
argument, intentionally creating dependency on humans is what is unjus-
tifi able. This is in contrast to Taylor’s (1992) interpretation. Feeding wild 
animals and culling them at these sites would clearly violate both the duty 
of non-interference with wild animals and the duty of fi delity, meaning not 
to deceive wild animals. 
For all intents and purposes, wild boars begin as sovereigns in 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework, who shun interaction with humans. 
Respecting this, humans have previously honoured their “natural compe-
tence” and capacity for survival (Regan 1983) by not interfering in their 
predation, feeding or breeding cycles. Although having started from a posi-
tion as sovereigns, we contend boars have now moved increasingly toward 
denizenship. This follows from their dependency on human-provided 
foods and their resultant routine transgression on human settlements. In 
this way, their denizenship is partly something we have caused, but also a 
natural result of their dispersal following increased populations. As den-
izens who interact or make use of human resources, their crop raiding 
behaviour have inscribed them with labels of pests and parasites, and 
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they are termed ‘pig devils’ in some parts of Southern Sweden (Johansson 
2005). An important corollary of their moving toward denizenship is that 
boars are becoming subjects in regards to whom it is thought justifi able 
to suspend our moral obligations. This much is often the case for varmint 
(Lukasik and Alexander 2011). In this regard they are paralleled by the 
status of undocumented immigrants or a rabble population—they are nei-
ther owed the duties commanded by pets as co-citizens, nor the respect for 
autonomy owed to sovereign wildlife. 
Nonetheless, hunters defend supplementary feeding by fi rst purporting 
that the size of wildlife populations are best regulated through hunting at 
this point and not through starvation. Culling at feeding stations is pre-
sented as the most effi cient and humane way of dealing with the boars. 
To be sure, hunters who practice supplementary feeding of wild boars kill 
three times as many boars as those who do not (Dunkley and Cattet 2003; 
Geisser and Reyer 2004). This higher kill-ratio refl ects an interesting fault 
line between bird feeding and game feeding. Where the former is linked to 
promoting values of conservation (Green and Higginbottom 2000), the 
latter appears to cultivate a stronger predation ethic (Dunkley and Cattet 
2003). 
The hunters that defend the management of wild boars through feed-
ing and culling as the more humane alternative join a prominent utilitarian 
narrative within hunting ethics. Namely, that it is less painful for an ani-
mal to die from a swift gunshot by a skilled hunter than it is from disease, 
starvation, or natural predation in the wild (Loftin 1984; Everett 2001; 
Svendsen Bjørkdahl 2005; Cahoone 2009). Hunters are consequently 
presumed ethical by intervening to remedy nature’s ‘grisly drama’ (Sagoff 
1984; Hettinger 1994; Samuel 1999). In Swedish, it is arguably signifi cant 
that that the term for game management is the equivalent of ‘wildlife care’. 
Critics of the duty-to-prevent-suffering argument, however, suggest hunt-
ers’ self-representation as “Florence Nightingales with rifl es” (Kerasote 
1994) is a sanitization of something that is motivated by more esoteric 
drivers than doing what is best for the animals. 
A second defence of supplementary feeding offered by hunters is to 
highlight the moral inconsistencies of feeding certain species and with-
holding this intervention from others. Here, they may contend bird-feed-
ing is a suffi ciently popular practice that it imparts virtue to providing for 
wild animals through harsh times. Or, they may argue that proliferation 
of the great tit (Parus major), a commonly fed wild species in the coun-
try, is not producing observable damage in the same way as do the wild 
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boars. But, even if the tit’s impact is not conspicuously nuisant to humans, 
it is obviously false to presume that proliferation has no such negative 
effects on other species; or indeed, the ecosystem of which they form a 
part (Brittingham and Temple 1988). 
Third, hunters might defend supplementary feeding by arguing for 
the intrinsic virtue of stewarding wild animals. Orams (2002) declares 
that the sharing of food with animals is a spiritual, reciprocal, and natu-
ral parenting response across human cultures. Feminist scholars in par-
ticular have embraced this refrain, critiquing the hands-off approaches 
advocated by the liberal, justice-based slant to animal rights (Noddings 
1984; Curtin 1991; Clement 2003). Their views are substantiated by 
anthropologists who posit that the provision of small amounts of food 
to attract wildlife has in all likelihood featured in human settlements for 
millennia (Kellert 1997). It is only in recent decades that this feature of 
human settlement has become extensive, commercialized and linked to 
game management practices (Chinery 2004). It is easy to challenge this 
argument, however, as guilty of the naturalistic fallacy on two related 
fronts. To wit, neither historical precedence nor human biology can offer 
a cosmic sanction for a human cultural practice (Bateson 1989; Moriarty 
and Woods 1997). 
Fourth and fi nally, hunters might appeal to biocentrist ethics by argu-
ing that they value the well-being of individual animals with whom some 
sort of relation is established (as local residents or symbionts) above that 
of abstract cascade effects that may occur within the ecosystem, as a 
result of interference with food cycles. While a prima facie questionable 
justifi cation, this is certainly the worldview taken by many bird-feeding 
members of the public. Those wild animals they can see outside their 
window take precedence over abstract contingencies and interspecies 
dynamics, such as the well-fed great tit out-competing other birds for 
nesting sites. 
Indeed, the public might not approach any ecocentrist outlook until 
feeding wildlife becomes a large-scale, impersonal enterprise. At this point, 
morality shifts from ‘playing angel’ in prosaic small-scale interventions 
with proximate others to ‘playing god’ in systemic intervention (Henderson 
2009). These arguments considered, we agree with scholars that one should 
be somewhat cautious about attributing kindness and sensitivity to hunters 
along the above lines of argumentation (Wood Jr. 1996; Luke 1997). Such 
kindness, after all, is diffi cult to reconcile with the principles that sanction 
killing.
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3. APPEALS TO NON-DOMINATION – FEEDING IN REPUBLICAN 
THEORY
3.1. The Problem of Sovereignty 
If we accept the originally sovereign status of wild boars, we make 
some tenuous assumptions that necessarily accompany the application of 
human political concepts to non-human animals. For one, it might be 
argued that in assigning them statuses of citizenship or sovereignty, we 
inadvertently bind them to certain obligations and standards that they 
have neither asked for nor have the capacity to fulfi ll (Scruton 2000). 
Second, and more importantly, we imply wild boars as sovereigns possess 
a meaningful concept of self-determination, in the sense of a “normatively 
defi ned authority structure existing within a community.” (Wadiwel, 
2013). But such a conception of sovereignty is diffi cult to discern in most 
animal cases. Indeed, in response to Zoopolis, scholars now seriously ques-
tion the utility of applying the sovereignty concept to animals (Cochrane 
2013; Horta 2013; Hinchcliffe 2015; Ladwig 2015). While some wild 
animals do possess authority structures that regulate important aspects 
of their lives, including predation, reproduction and migration (Palmer, 
2012), the normative and conceptual implications of sovereignty requires 
a shared collective interest in self-determination. This is beyond even pack 
animals’ social horizon of orientation (Ladwig 2015). In the case of wild 
boars, there are few, if any, abiding qualifying structures in their commu-
nities that we know of.1
Donaldson and Kymlicka respond this concern by expanding the con-
cept of sovereignty from beyond legal institutions, while having sovereignty 
fulfi ll the same function: a principled and pragmatic argument for prevent-
ing injustices against the wilderness (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). For 
them, sovereignty as understood in the animal case now merely entails 
1) an independent existence, 2) upon which value is placed, 3) resistance 
to alien rule and 4) the possession of recognisable interests in their social 
organization. These criteria for sovereignty could reasonably apply to wild 
boars. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka would likely contend by appeal to 
the ideas of MacKinnon (2005) that boars demonstrate their sovereignty 
not by collective self-determination, but by “voting with their feet;” or, in 
this case hooves, insofar as they shun human interference. But this seems 
to us, to divest sovereignty of its essential institutional political features. 
We therefore contend the wild boar population can be understood as qual-
ifying as a community, but not a sovereign body. In this respect, the boar 
community is not dissimilar to the marginal cases of humans in terms of 
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their lack of voice and lack of political autonomy (Eckersley 1999; Wong 
2010). 
If, like Horta (2013), we take community as a weakened form of sov-
ereignty, and, like Hinchcliffe (2015), members as weakened forms of cit-
izens, then by parity of reasoning what we should be concerned with is 
protecting the goods of its members and protecting them from domination, 
and not the elusive, political marker of sovereignty that does not meaning-
fully obtain for most animal cases. Indeed, sovereignty obscures interfer-
ences which are consistent with the ends of the community by appealing 
to a violation of a non-existent authority structure. To overcome this, we 
need a more appropriate theory of interference that admits of human obli-
gations to legitimate the act. 
3.2. The Solution of Republicanism
We began by noting that the political turn in animal rights, and indeed 
now even in RART, is characterised by a liberal framework that over-
whelmingly works with negative freedoms. But we believe republicanism 
to be a better fi t for the types of positive, relational rights and duties that 
arise in the shared interspecies community. Republicanism has enjoyed 
a revival in political philosophy that understands freedom as embracing 
collective membership, intersubjective reason and rights of contestation 
(Allen 2011; Benton 2011). It locates freedom not in the absence of inter-
ferences but in a state of non-domination, which is achieved insofar as the 
subject is free from arbitrary interference with his or her actions (Pettit 
1996; Pettit 2001). To the extent that this is a perspective that can clarify 
the legitimacy of interferences with wild animals, the republican concep-
tion of freedom can be distinguished from the liberal negative freedom 
through the example of guards in wildlife parks dominating the animals 
under their supervision. 
In this scenario, even if they are permitted to live their lives absent 
interference, the animals in the park remain utterly subject to the arbitrary 
will of the guard (Ladwig 2015). Indeed, by itself, the liberal criterion of 
non-interference offers no principled guidance as to whether or not inter-
ference by the guard is justifi ed to secure an animal’s good when this is 
jeopardized by any number of contingencies. In other words, it is insuffi -
ciently sensitive to tell us when there is something wrong with the negative 
stance of the guard, and why the latter should be bound by positive obliga-
tions of interference. To be sure, the guard may resort to ad hoc pragmatic 
or consequentialist reasons to act on behalf of the animals, but remains a 
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dominator as long as these responses lack any well-defi ned principled justi-
fi cation. In this respect, republican theory demands that important criteria 
relating to the subject’s good and the contestability of the relation are met. 
Moreover, these are criteria that cannot be subsumed under Donaldson 
and Kymlicka’s appeal to the sovereignty of wild animals for reasons we 
shall further develop shortly, which concern the limited cognitive capaci-
ties of animals such as the boars. 
The fi rst criterion to freedom from domination may be attained if the 
interference is consistent with the good of the subject. To clarify, when 
countries provide emergency aid to other sovereign states in times of crisis 
interference is exercised towards those states as self-determining subjects 
(Ladwig 2015). But interference and dependency are hardly breaches of 
sovereignty in this case. Instead, they are consistent with the common good 
of those who comprise that subject as a national people having suffered 
some calamity. But a similar point can also be made without reference to 
the idea of sovereignty in the very different case of dependent children. 
After all, few would contest that parents caring for their children through 
their development into adults constitutes a case of arbitrary, dominating 
interference. Few would contest this given that positive interference is exer-
cised non-arbitrarily in their best interest, as immature humans with decid-
edly limited capacities for sovereign self-determination. 
As for the second criterion, non-domination can be secured through 
self-initiated accountability mechanisms that check the arbitrariness of 
the interference. These include public justifi cation, public contestation, 
and retribution (Benton 2014). Here, the non-arbitrariness of interference 
may be justifi ed through a combination of tracking common interests and 
holding open the permanent possibility of contestation on behalf of oth-
ers. So, interference through foreign aid is subject to oversight by NGOs 
and IGOs, whose judgments are publicly contestable. Would-be interfer-
ers are held accountable for how they interfere by those who experience 
their interference as domination taking their grievances for adjudication in 
international courts. Or, regarding dependent children lacking developed 
powers of autonomy and self-determination, parental interference may still 
constitute non-domination to the extent it can be appropriately checked by 
publicly contestable child protection laws. 
3.3 The Species Good of Wild Boars
The contestability of the interference with wild boars means little 
unless we can show that it promotes the ‘common good’ of the subject. 
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How might we understand the impact of supplemental feeding on the com-
mon good of wild boars? ‘The species norm’ might be the closest approx-
imation of the good presented so far (Rollin 1992; Nussbaum 2006). This 
is developed in response to errors necessarily associated with conceiving 
of the good at the individual biocentrist level and the ecosystemic level 
respectively. To exemplify this, Rolston III (1985) argues that, at the level 
of the individual organism, even reproduction may be unnecessary as it 
entails duress, risk, and energy expenditure. This would skew the argu-
ment heavily in favor of supplementary feeding as an immediate, short-
term good for the hungry boar, but that is too simplistic. Conversely, if 
viewed ecocentrically, the common good of the boars might be the cessa-
tion, or gradual phasing out, of supplementary feeding to ensure that the 
population returns to the actual carrying capacity of the environment. But 
this would necessarily entail sacrifi cing individuals, which is diffi cult to 
reconcile with the common good of the wild boar species.
The species norm instead proceeds on a middle-ground and eschews 
the pitfalls of the biocentrist and ecocentrist perspectives respectively. It is a 
good that can be apprehended without the insider perspective of the organ-
ism (Rollin 1992). It can be identifi ed by observing that certain activities 
constitutively contribute to their well-being as a species (Ladwig 2015). 
The anthropocentrism inherent to ascertaining the species norm of any 
non-human animal is counteracted to the extent that studies are grounded 
in close observation and an openness of perspective that can cultivate 
an understanding of their particular needs (Donovan 2006). Where wild 
boars are concerned, the species thrives when rooting, foraging, wallowing 
in dirt or against trees, feeding from diverse foods given their omnivore sta-
tus and adaptability. Moreover, they are social creatures who synchronise 
birth and nursing behavior within matriarchal units. Mindful of this, what 
does the interference of supplemenary feeding do to these goods?  
3.4 Justifying Interference with the Common Good of Boars
Ways in which supplemental feeding would violate the species norm 
of boars and present a relation of domination include the following. The 
good of boars would be inhibited to the extent that supplementary feeding 
compromised their natural behaviour or frustrated their preferences for 
the abovementioned activities (Horta 2013). If feeding limited the range 
of things they could do and food sources from which they could forage, 
their options would be frustrated, and such restrictions are immoral (Bell 
2006). For example, we will have interfered with their common good if 
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the following effects were demonstrated. First, if supplementary feeding 
resulted in wild boars becoming less wary of humans in a way that might 
endanger them. Second, if we found that boars suffered any of the negative 
physiological or pathological effects of supplementary feeding purported 
in some research reports. These include stress from overcrowding at sta-
tions, the spread of diseases, or placing them at risk from lurking predators 
(Fischer; Stallknecht, Luttrell, Page; Dhondt and Converse 1997; Orams 
2002; Dunkley and Cattet 2003). 
Third, if a pathological adaptation to feeding stations contributed to a 
loss in capacity for natural foraging behavior. Ordinarily, the provision of 
supplementary feeding to an omnivore with a wide range of choices of feed 
would not impose high exit costs on the dependent subject (Lovett 2010). 
Exit costs pertain to the harms of deprivation associated with leaving the 
relation. As Wall (2001) asserts: 
…submission to the arbitrary will of another does not really constitute 
being dominated by the other if one is perfectly free to walk away from 
the relationship whenever one wants without incurring any signifi cant 
costs. (51)
Because of wild boars’ opportunism and fl exibility (Lindblom 2011), 
they could sustain themselves by alternating between their diverse natu-
ral food sources: leaves, bark, insects, earthworms, bird eggs, frogs, fi sh, 
roots, tubers, nuts, and a range of crops including maize, wheat, and sugar 
beets (Wilson 2004; Herrero, García-Serrano, Couto, Ortuño, Vicente, and 
García-González 2006). The exit costs for wild boars from this feeding 
relation then are relatively low compared, for example, to koala bears 
who feed exclusively on Eucalyptus trees. Nonetheless, we caution against 
appealing to the criterion of exit costs for determining domination, as we 
advocate abandoning the concept of sovereignty with respect to boars. 
Boars lack the necessary authority structures and critical faculties to exer-
cise choice in walking away from the interference. Presented with easily 
accessible, high starch foods, they will automatically prefer these offerings. 
In the winter months, these sources will be even more attractive in compar-
ison to the poor prospects elsewhere. Here, Lovett (2010) terms the pres-
ence of dismal choice (or in the boar’s case, no choice) a case of agentless 
domination, in virtue of creating a relation of de facto dependence. 
So far however, feeding has not resulted in any of the aforementioned 
side-effects. Boars have no natural predators that can take advantage of 
their vulnerablity, apart from humans.2 To borrow Palmer’s (2010) termi-
nology, they are no less wild in the dispositional sense than before because 
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they now feed at secluded forest stations. Indeed, they are a notoriously 
rare sight even by hunters’ admissions. No sick boars have been uncovered, 
indeed the hardy stomach of the boar makes it apt to withstand the bac-
teria associated with feeding from the ground. There is only ever one pack 
of boars at the feeding station at any one time because boars are naturally 
shy and live in matriarchal units. They do not seem to mind crowding 
around their siblings for food or suffer density dependence (Magnusson 
2010; Borowik, Curnlier, and Jędrzejewska 2013). The one concern raised 
by wildlife managers in Sweden is that boars that regularly feed on sugar 
beets or unlawfully provided pastries risk sustaining cavities (Sveriges 
Radio 2007) 
Finally, we must ask whether the presence of viable accountability 
mechanisms can render the interference of maintaining or stopping feed-
ing non-arbitrary. On the one hand, justifi cation refers to the tracking of 
common interests in the policy-making process, while accountability is 
an ex post mechanism that sanctions breaches of these interests. These 
two mechanisms pose few problems in the context of promoting the com-
mon interests of boars because they are administered by agents other than 
the hunters: for instance, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA), but also the criminal justice system in which boar feeding related 
offenses have been prosecuted in accordance with the hunting decree 
(Naturtidning 2004; Willsäter 2013). But, on the other hand, contestation 
requires self-initiation on the part of those who believe themselves to be the 
victims of dominating interference. This raises the altogether obvious prob-
lem that boars are not intentional agents who are capable of undertaking 
contestations addressed to the SEPA or criminal courts. To the extent they 
themselves are not intentional agents capable of self-initiation, the boars 
necessarily poses a problem of agent-less domination for anyone who 
would undertake contestations on their behalf in these fora. Nonetheless, 
we believe that it is reasonable to compensate for the absence of boars’ 
intentionality and capability to address legal and political institutions by 
motivating a form of proxy contestation. This requires human proxies for 
boars to approximate and extrapolate from their perspectives in order to 
determine and promote their best interests when making contestations 
of current policy on their behalf. Donaldson and Kymlicka contend that 
such ‘trust models’ (Silvers and Francis 2005) in the form of ombudsmen, 
trustees, and advocates can exercise non-human animals’ voice in institu-
tional fora. We belive their reasoning is sound on this point. In Sweden, the 
SEPA rules on many hunting decisions, and nearly all wildlife management 
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issues. But these rulings can be effectively contested by animal rights offi ces 
and animal welfare NGOs, possessing considerable power to ensure that 
the rights and interests of future generations and non-humans are heard 
as non-communicating co-citizens and liminals (Epstein and Darpö 2013). 
4. OBJECTIONS TO THE REPUBLICAN FRAMEWORK
In our introduction, we contended that Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
(2011) liberal political framework for RART points towards the repub-
lican standard that human interferences with non-humans should be 
non-arbitrary and non-dominating. In the above section, we subsequently 
re-apprehend interference in light of this standard. But this still leaves us 
with a range of diffi culties accommodating non-human animals within the 
human parameters of political concepts, as characteristic of RART and the 
political turn. Consequently, we now critically engage some objections to 
using these concepts for understanding our relations and obligations to 
non-humans. We have already indicated problems with Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s appeal to the concept of sovereignty. We now turn to further 
complications regarding the boars’ lack of moral powers and their lack of 
an authority structure. We also consider the problem of free will as it is 
understood in the animal context and some of the limitations of pursuing 
proxy contestation on their behalf. 
First, Pettit’s concept of domination as arbitrary interference neces-
sarily involves overriding the moral powers of other humans for autono-
mous self-determination. It interferes with their ability to make revisable 
life-plans that are respectful one another’s freedom and so become the 
captains of their own fate (Rawls 2005; Pettit 1996). But how does this 
apply to the boars? Do they possess functionally equivalent moral pow-
ers that could be overridden in such a way that they may be said to 
suffer domination? We have contended that wild boars indeed possess 
subjective goods and the capacity to comply with a certain degree with 
social cooperation defi ning their common species-life. However, they 
cannot conceptualize their future selves or formulate any revisable plan 
of life based on that conceptualization. Given the more limited form 
of moral powers they possess, boars cannot communicate to us their 
subjective goods in the manner of other humans capable of exercising 
the moral powers of self-determination in a system of just cooperation. 
This creates a problem regarding the cognitive dimension to domina-
tion. Earlier, we argued that the animals in a nature park are dominated 
because of the guard’s potential to interfere arbitrarily. But this example 
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differs from the key example of domination in the republicanism litera-
ture—the relation of human master and human slave. Here, the slave is 
dominated by the master because of the former is able to anticipate that 
the latter can interfere arbitrarily, at any time (Pettit 1996). Indeed, it is 
this ability to conceptualize future interference that keeps the slave cowed 
and impedes his ability to use his moral powers to formulate a plan of 
life. But boars cannot anticipate arbitrary interference, and so prima facie 
it would seem that they cannot be dominated in this cognitivist sense. 
Hence, the application of the concept of domination to the boars calls for 
a departure from a condition of Pettit’s theory: that the dominated must 
possess sovereign powers of self-determination, which can be overridden 
by a dominator. Consequently, we must appeal to domination in a suit-
ably weakened form that relaxes Pettit’s condition that the domination 
entails an ability to anticipate arbitrary interference. 
Adjusted to agentless domination in Lovell’s (2010) sense, we believe 
this weakened form is consistent with idea of domination as arbitrary 
interference in a range of marginal human cases. These include the severely 
cognitively disabled (Wong 2010), future generations of humans (Nolt 
2011), children (Wilson 2001), in addition to some elders as subjects of 
domination. In these marginal human cases, interference may be arbitrary 
and dominating, but not because the cognitively disabled, future gener-
ations, and so on, are prevented from exercising their sovereign powers 
of self-determination by formulating revisable life-plans. All are cases of 
agentless or weak domination, in which the dominated lack these powers 
either entirely or in some substantial degree. 
Previously, we acknowledged that the inability of boars to contest 
could be resolved by appeal to proxy contestation. Indeed, we now argue 
that this would proceed along the same lines as proxy contestation for 
future generations and other marginal cases. By analogy with boars, 
the latter cannot exercise their permanent possibility of contestation 
on account of not yet having been born, but they are not withheld the 
right to have this right exercised through proxies. But the analogy here 
is imperfect. Can boars be said to have the right to permanent possibility 
contestation through proxies? That is, can they be said to have such a 
right, given that they are complete creations who will never develop the 
cognitive capacities to contest by their own lights (Scruton 2000)? Unlike 
children and future generations, boars do not possess the potential to 
develop and become full moral members of society. In other words, they 
do not possess the potential for self-intitiation and self-determination. 
03_v21_n1_von Essen.indd   76 3/15/2016   4:17:25 PM
ERICA VON ESSEN AND MICHAEL P. ALLEN THE REPUBLICAN ZOOPOLIS 77
Not possessing this potential, they cannot be said to have a right to proxy 
contestation.
According to this objection, it is inappropriate to approximate simi-
larities between marginal cases and animals. Indeed, it is tantamount to 
an anthropormpophism that attributes far too much ‘humanity’ to ani-
mals (Murdy 1998) and may be offensive to marginal humans. But this 
critique is diffi cult to substantiate. It is premised on a Cartesian blind that 
arbitrarily separes humans from non-human animals (Noske 2004). Even 
at cost of affording a higher moral status to severely cognitively disabled 
humans compared to animals that display cognitive capacities at times 
greater than those of marginal humans in certain selected tasks (Rogers 
and Kaplan 2004). There is now ample evidence not only of unique forms 
of animal intelligence, but of the present inability of humans to transcend 
human mediated systems of interpreting these expressions (Driessen 2014). 
Anthropocentrism thus challenges the analogy at a fundamental level 
(Noske 1997), including the narrow ways in which cognition is currently 
understood and tested (Rogers and Kaplan 2004). We believe, then, that 
objections to this analogy on the basis that wild boars possess lower cogni-
tive capacity as conventionally interpreted, or that as non-human animals 
they are fundamentally outside of the moral realm inhabited by marginal 
humans, are misguided. 
Wild boars are on an equal moral footing with cognitively disabled 
humans insofar as they constitute moral patients to whom the rest of us 
are interrelated and to whom we owe obligations of care and respect. As 
moral patients, boars may be said to care about what happens to them-
selves without knowing that they do so. In simplest possible terms, they 
care about rolling in the mud, grubbing for roots, etc.—all those activities 
we equated with their good as a species. But they do not conceptualize 
these activities as for their good or formulate any life-plans on the basis of 
such higher-order conceptualizations (neither do marginal cases). At least, 
if they do, it is not something to which current cognition tests, however 
fl awed, can testify. But this should not be a barrier and much less the cause 
for withholding of rights. Caring about their good without knowing it, 
their behaviors are purposive in the sense of aiming to fulfi l those goods 
that they cannot, to our limited knowledge, conceptualize. Having pur-
poses is the key to having the right to freedom (Gerwith 1978), even on the 
level of purposiveness exhibited by moral patients. 
Indeed, the argument from marginal human cases demonstrates that 
we cannot easily deny moral patients the right to proxy contestation over 
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their freedom. We certainly acknowledge that we are related to cognitively 
disabled humans in ways that create obligations towards them. We also 
acknowledge that it would be unacceptable to arbitrarily interfere with 
their enjoyments of goods they cannot conceptize as their goods on the 
basis of such cognitive or communicative defi cits. Instead, we see it as mor-
ally encumbent on us to identify those goods appropriate to their range of 
characteristic purposive activites and to modulate our behaviors in rela-
tionship to them, according to our determination of their good. Indeed, for 
us to arbitrarily interfere with their purposive activities in pursuit of goods 
they can neither articulate nor communicate to us would surely amount to 
domination, albeit in the weakened form we identifi ed above. 
Consequently, we now say that domination in the weak form con-
sists of arbitrary interference not with the self-chosen life-plans of rational 
agents with capacities for self-determination, but rather arbitrary interfer-
ence with the good of any creature with whom we are interrelated. This 
is domination in the weak form consisting in arbitrary interference with a 
creature’s good, as identifi ed by virtue of careful observation of its char-
acteristic set of purposive behaviours (Gudorf 2010). In the case of boars, 
this means that careful observation and identifi cation of their species-good 
becomes the basis of proxy contestations of arbitrary or dominating inter-
ference. Such proxy contestations thus compensate for their inability to 
articulate their own good and to make use of this communicatively as the 
basis of self-intitiated contestations. 
It might still be objected, though, that the boars cannot contest how 
their good is represented in proxy contestations. This much is certainly 
true. As representations of the boars’ good, proxy contestations would have 
to be understood on the model of discursive representative claim-making 
(Saward 2006). Here, proxies would claim to represent the boars’ good by 
depicting it in this or that way. For instance, they may depict the boars’ 
good as consisting in wallowing in mud and grubbing for roots free from 
the arbitrary interfere of humans who would render them de facto depen-
dent on feeding stations. The virtue of this discursive model of represen-
tation as claim-making is that it dispenses with the need to conceive of 
representation in terms of elections and voting—activities in which boars 
obviously cannot participate (Smith 2012; Driessen 2014). Indeed, if the 
good of boars is to be represented by proxies, then it has to be on this dis-
cursive model of representation. 
But discursive representations are legitimate only to the extent that 
they are contestable and those purportedly represented by a claim-maker 
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can either accept or reject how they are represented. Claims to represent 
the good of the boars necessarily fail to satisfy this legimitating condition 
of discursive representation. To this extent, claims made by proxies to rep-
resent the good of boars would have to be reconceived so as to accom-
modate the weak form of domination. What would that mean? Claims 
to represent the good of boars should be acknowleded as legitimate, even 
though the represented—the boars—cannot contest how they are repre-
sented by the claim-makers who undertake proxy contestations on their 
behalf. This would not be problematic if the good of boars in relation to 
humans—hunters, state regulators, or animal rights advocates—could be 
treated as uncontroversial. But that is obviously not so. 
Indeed, their good could be represented in other ways by other human 
claim-makers with different political agendas. Hunters might discursively 
represent the boars’ good as a plentiful food supply in the summer months 
with the possibility of a clear kill relieving them of the agonies of slow 
starvation through the winter months. Who, then, is to say which represen-
tative claim is more representative of the boars’ good? That of the proxies 
claiming to represent the boars’ good through contestatons of supple-
mentary feeding practices, or that of the hunters claiming to represent the 
boars’ good through advocacy of such practices? The only uncontroversial 
answer to this question is that it cannot be a boar, for all its cognitive 
capacities that have yet to be revealed. But neither should it be any partic-
ular human. Rather, the legitimation of claims to represent the boars must 
be a function of open public deliberation among a pluralism of human 
claim-makers, boar-proxies, hunters, farmers, regulators, ecologists and 
wildlife-managers, and so on. In the language of deliberative democracy 
familiar from the work of Habermas (1985), legitimacy is the outcome of 
a deliberative process that includes the perspectives of all actors who are 
potentially affected by a public decision. To this extent, legitimacy is the 
outcome of the unforced force of the better argument. 
Obviously, the boars themselves are affected by the resulting decision, 
and they are likely to be affected in ways that are more fundamental than 
hunters, farmers, and so on. After all, depending on the decision, they could 
get shot or they could lose a welcome feeding source. But the legitimacy of 
a decision is not forthcoming in any other way. A public decision cannot 
be said to be delegitimized because it is not contested by those whose good 
has been represented in a particular way but who cannot themselves con-
test this representation. Especially not when claim-makers and those they 
claim discursively to represent are already interrelated across species lines. 
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Decisions have to be reached and so their legitimation must depend on the 
robust characters of the deliberative process of examining different kinds 
of representations of the boar’s good and assessing their plausibility for 
satisfying the standard on non-arbitrary interference in light of multiple 
factors. This would include examination of the motivations of different 
kinds of claim-makers for self-interested biases in their representations of 
the boars’ good and a critical survey of the scientifi c literature on the phys-
iological, pathological, ethological, and ecological characteristics of boars 
and the projected impacts of alternative kinds of interferences. But we also 
contend that policy needs to be validated discursively in moral concerns 
(Habermas 1996).
To render these recommendations concrete, the wild boar management 
issue in Sweden as well as elsewhere requires appropriate fora at insti-
tutional levels. Consistent with our previous work (von Essen and Allen 
2015), we advocate the creation of deliberative mini-publics targeting 
affected actors with interests in representing the boar and challenging them 
to defend their representation in light of expert and scientifi c information. 
We contend the potential for a policy solution held as legitimate by all is 
relatively high, given that the wild boar represents a new game species 
without a management tradition which might otherwise challenge consen-
sus. Unlike the case for more controversial species, such as wolves, prac-
tices and ethics toward the boar are being continuously negotiated by a 
wide range of actors, primarily across media (Larsson 2014; Olsson 2014). 
We argue a RART-informed political discussion in mini-publics that 
centres on the place of boars in the landscape and our interspecies relations 
represents a far more constructive approach than contesting claims made 
in media. Moreover, mini-publics of human claim-makers not only subjects 
alternative representations of the boar’s good to critical scrutiny, but also 
the self-representation of hunters as themselves the victims of arbitrary 
interferences by state regulation of their interactions with boars. Indeed, 
hunters frequently present themselves as the victims of domination insofar 
as hunting regulations may impede their ability to pursue life-plans that 
include taking the lives of non-humans for sport. Such self-representations 
would be problematized just as much as the other-regarding representa-
tions offered in public deliberation by boar-proxies. 
5. CONCLUSION: A REPUBLICAN FRAMEWORK
Where does this now leave us with respect to a republican frame-
work for relational animal ethics? We began by noting Donaldson and 
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Kymlicka’s political approach to RART already pointed in a republican 
direction. It pointed to republicanism insofar as it explicitly problematized 
liberal freedom as non-interference in abolitionist and hand-off approaches 
to animal rights, instead favouring the integration of negative rights and 
positive relations. But we also signalled certain conceptual weakness in 
their approach to RART, especially with respect to their use of the con-
cepts of sovereignty and representation. Indeed, we have reinterpreted the 
political turn in light of a republican conception of the obligation to ensure 
that human interferences with non-humans satisfy a standard of non-arbi-
trariness or non-domination. 
To follow through on this reinterpretation, however, we have argued 
for a weakening of the concept of domination in republican theory. In 
particular, it must be weakened to accommodate agentless domination 
in which arbitrary interference cannot be understood as overriding any 
sovereign powers of self-determination. Agentless domination, though, 
encounters the problem that boars as dominated cannot undertake con-
testations of their own relations of domination with humans. To com-
pensate for this cognitive and communicative defi cit on their part, we 
appealed to proxy contestations in which human proxies purport to 
represent the good of the boars. Here, we attempted to clarify, where 
Donaldson and Kymlicka do not, the nature of such representation 
by appeal to the idea of contestable representative claim-making. But, 
again, discursive representative claim-making is not contestable by the 
boars as the represented. Consequently, the legitimacy of interferences 
depends upon a discourse of human agents with competing interests in 
representing the good of boars in publicly contestable ways. Indeed, such 
a discourse may be facilitated by the creation of institutional fora in 
which differently-interested representative claim-makers are challenged 
to defend their claims regarding the good of boars in light of empirical 
studies and information. 
All in all, then, we claim to have provided a viable republican frame-
work for RART that expands on the work begun by Donaldson and 
Kymlicka and resolves the weakness in their approach with respect to sov-
ereignty and representation. Contrary to them, we have argued that sov-
ereignty is not a useful concept for RART and that it should be dropped 
in light of the problem of agentless domination. RART cannot, however, 
do without a concept of representation, but this has to be adapted to the 
same problem of domination. This is accomplished by discursive repre-
sentation, provided that claims to represent the goods of non-humans 
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can be robustly contested in appropriate institutional fora challenging the 
biases and epistemic limitations of claim-makers. Our argument has not 
been concerned with advancing any particular proposal with respect to 
continuing, discontinuing or regulating feeding stations to any greater or 
lesser extent. Instead, it has been concerned only with advancing a suitable 
political framework of legitimation for reaching justifi able public decisions 
regarding the latter range of options. Any such decisions with respect to 
what constitutes non-arbitrary interference tracking the good of boars and 
establishing non-dominating inter-species relations with them must sur-
vive robust deliberative testing across the diverse perspectives of interested 
claim-makers and experts. 
NOTES
1 Apart from a maternal line orientation
2 A future concern may be that where boar and wolf populations coincide, pig-
lets might be of some risk. This is however not substantiated by any research.
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